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(265). Further he argues that history is the object of study in which the
findings of patterns is possible, but it is impossible to orchestrate them into
a theory of history due to the fact that “history gives no boundaries to its
subject” (271).
Finally, Bod’s history presents a more nuanced understanding of
western history and the development of modernity. It was not primarily
the “new scientists” such as Kepler, Galileo, or Bacon that torpedoed
the Christian-Aristotelian worldview. It rather was the sum of all early
modern scholarship, with philology as the most influential element.
With the humanists and their manuscript hunting (144), the need for the
analysis of the reliability of the sources became important, especially since
many forgeries were produced. With Valla’s employment of his principles
of consistency (chronological consistency, logical consistency, and linguistic
consistency) the foundation for modern source criticism has been laid.
The fruitfulness of this approach has led to the well-known denial of
the genuineness of the Donatio Constantini. The use of textual criticism
furthermore was utilized as a weapon against the Roman Catholic Church
during the reformation time (148). Further development of the text-critical
method (especially under Lachmann)—resembling to a great extent the
Islamic isnad method (150) and earlier Chinese textual criticism—led to the
rejection of Erasmus’ “textus receptus,” the reconstruction of Lucretius’
works, and the Nibelungenlied. Finally, philology undermined what has been
accepted as biblical authority. The consequences of the philological work
stimulated the development of the modern worldview even more than the
new sciences. National governments until this very day use source criticism
and philology in order to establish the reliability of documents.
Clearly, Bod’s New History of the Humanities should be read by every
scholar whether he comes from or comes to the field of natural science or
the humanities. I would not be surprised if this work becomes one of the
epochal works of the early twenty-first century.
Andrews University				

Oliver Glanz

Brown, Warren S., and Brad D. Strawn. The Physical Nature of Christian Life:
Neuroscience, Psychology, and the Church. New York: Cambridge University
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What are the ecclesiological implications of a wholistic anthropology?
Profound, according to Warren Brown, professor of psychology at Fuller
Theological Seminary, and his former student Brad Strawn, now of
Southern Nazarene University. Their well-researched, succinct, and readable
book offers a new perspective on Christian community. If human beings
are both embodied in physical forms and embedded in the world around
us, they argue—not only physically, but socially, culturally, and especially
psychologically—then interpersonal connections are constitutive of our
identity. When it comes to the Christian life, therefore, the church is not
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separable from or secondary to personal religious experience; it is essential to
it. The authors develop their thesis in three different stages.
Part I of the book sets the biblical teaching about human nature over
against the dualism that became dominant in Christian thought through
the influence of Augustine (who derived it from Plato) and Descartes. A
dualistic anthropology mitigates against the achievement of genuine Christian
community for several reasons. If the human soul is conceived along Gnostic
lines as an immaterial reality distinct from the physical body, then it is natural
to regard Christian spirituality as basically individual, inward, and private.
On this view, the relationships Christians have with one another are only
incidental to their spiritual identity. Connecting with other church members
may be a part of one’s spiritual life, but not essential to it. Participating with
others in worship and service are matters of personal preference. If some
find it helpful in their quest for personal spiritual fulfillment, well and good.
If others do not, equally well and good. Within such a perspective, the authors
argue, genuine Christian community is not merely elusive; it is impossible. A
mere aggregate of individuals does not, and cannot, constitute the body of
Christ. It can never become the sort of community envisioned in the New
Testament. The church is not just a collection of people who subscribe to the
same doctrines, adopt a common lifestyle, and follow more or less the same
private religious activities.
To support an embodied view of the human, Brown and Strawn review
the neurological evidence for localization, the fact that mental operations
and emotions have their physical bases in the different parts of our brains—
evidence presented earlier in such works as Whatever Happened to the Soul?
coedited by Brown along with Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Maloney, and
Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? by Nancey Murphy. Brown and Murphy are
well-known advocates of “non-reductive physicalism,” according to which
nothing human can exist apart from the body, yet a human being is more than
a mere succession of events in the physical world.
In Part II the authors explain how embodiment accounts for the
development of human persons. According to their description, the formative
factors in personal development are almost exclusively interpersonal. We
are what we are because we are not only embodied in physical forms but
embedded in a physical world surrounded by other similarly embodied human
beings. To explain how relationships shape us, the authors appeal to the
theory of complex dynamical systems, which accounts for the way complex
characteristics such as minds and personalities can emerge from myriad
ongoing interactions involving millions of parts.
A “system,” they indicate, as distinct from a mere aggregate, consists
of individual parts that function as a unit. A “dynamical” system is one that
has the capacity to reorganize in response to changes in the environment,
specifically in response to “catastrophes,” that is, mismatches between the
system and its surroundings. And the various factors than enable a system
to function dynamically, in the technical sense, are imitation, shared attention,
attachment, and empathy, along with language and story. Physically embodied
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and socially embedded in the world, the human self or person is subject to
continual growth and transformation.
When Brown and Strawn bring these insights to bear on the nature and
purpose of the church in the climactic section of the book (Part III), they
offer some rather striking conclusions. When it comes to spiritual formation,
they maintain, individual growth is a by-product of congregational growth.
Since the processes of human formation in general are primarily social,
spiritual growth is also social and interpersonal. An important element in
spiritual growth is the development of “secure attachments,” and the
necessary context for this to take place is small groups of people who spend
significant time together and learn to trust one another. It cannot happen
when groups are too large or when members meet together only sporadically.
A mere collection of people who “swarm” at the same time and place will
never become more than a loose association of the independently spiritual.
Furthermore, in a dynamical system, that is, one in which significant
growth can take place, there is reciprocal interaction between the individuals
and the group. A family is a good example of such a system. In a family,
influence flows from the individual to the group, and from the group back
to the individual. As a result of these interactions, the roles family members
play will be flexible, and the group as a whole proves to be more than the
sum of its individual parts. “Families and churches develop capacities that go
well beyond the singular capacities of any of the individuals in the family or
church” (129).
These observations have interesting implications for church size. From
the study of primate communities, scientists have concluded that the size of
the ideal group is related to the brain size of the species. The greater a species’
brain size, the larger the typical group its members forms. Accordingly, given
the relative size of the human neocortex, the ideal number of persons who
can form an effectively functioning human community is around 150, but this
is too large a group for truly effective interaction. The size of an “optimally
meshed network,” one in which there are at most two relational steps between
each member, is fifty persons, and the size of a “totally meshed network,” one
in which members have direct connections with each other, is about twelve
people (137).
Brown and Strawn’s observations are both informative and provocative.
They challenge a great deal of conventional thinking about the nature of
Christian spirituality. If human beings are embodied and embedded, as
extensive research indicates, there is something profoundly mistaken about
the religious individualism that is so pervasive today. If interpersonal
relationships are not incidental to our identity, but constitutive of it, then we
can be fully human, and we can be fully spiritual, only in community. And if
the church is to be a body in any significant sense, it will comprise relatively
small communities whose members interconnect over time in profoundly
personal ways.
Their observations also challenge a great deal of conventional thinking
about the church, including such things as congregational size, the measure

342

Seminary Studies 52 (Autumn 2014)

of denominational success, and the purpose of the church’s mission. If
the essential purpose of the church is to cultivate significant interpersonal
relationships, and this can only happen in relatively small groups, then the
formation of such groups should be a high priority. In the case of large
churches, those with hundreds or thousands of members, church can happen,
so to speak, only with the formation of small groups, churches within the
church.
Their conclusions also redirect the focus of attention when it comes to
the church’s mission. Some Christian traditions or organizations encourage
a strong sense of global identity. They provide information about church
members in various parts of the world, especially in places where the church
is growing remarkably or where church members are facing serious challenges.
And they emphasize the important role that official church leaders play in
coordinating its various activities, clarifying its doctrines, and establishing
uniform policies for the entire membership. What does not get much
attention by comparison is just what these scholars maintain is vital to the
church conceived as the body of Christ, namely, the development of strong
relationships within local congregations. If Brown and Strawn are on the right
track, something more is needed than the concept that the church is primarily
a worldwide movement that is identified by a message that is conceived as a
set of doctrinal convictions. A collection of individuals does not constitute
the church if it is defined only by a unified organization, commonly held
beliefs, and similar religious practices. Church truly exists, their observations
indicate, only where there is genuine community, that is, only where there are
groups of Christians who form close caring relationships.
Brown and Strawn do not provide a full-fledged ecclesiology, nor do
they intend to. The interface between church and society, or between church
and world, does not come up. Nor does the perplexing phenomenon of all
the deeply felt and long-standing divisions within Christianity. We could go
on. But what they offer as a very specific proposal, namely, that a biblically
informed concept of the church must take into account the wholistic view
that humans are physically embodied and socially embedded, is entirely
successful.
Loma Linda University				

Richard Rice
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What is the appropriate relation between the relative strength of the evidence
that supports a religious belief and the degree of confidence with which the
belief is held? In The Predicament of Belief Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp
develop a carefully formulated response to this persistent question. The
predicament of which they speak applies to those who find the claims of
Christianity problematic from the standpoint of scientific and historical

